Abstract-Any secured system can be modeled as a capabilitybased access control system in which each user is given a set of secret keys of the resources he is granted access to. In some systems which are sensitive to key storage cost, key derivation is commonly used. With a goal to minimize the maximum key storage per user, key compression based on key linking, that is, deriving one key from another without compromising security, is studied. A lower bound on key storage needed for a general access structure with key derivation is derived. This bound demonstrates the theoretic limit of any systems which do not trade off security and can be treated as a negative result to provide ground for designs with security tradeoff. A concrete, provably secure key linking scheme based on pseudorandom functions is given, along with an algorithm for finding optimal key linking patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
In any computer system offering security-related services, it is a basic necessity that its users have access to some private information to give them leverage over an adversary. These secret pieces of information are commonly known as (cryptographic) keys. The key is usually used as input to protocols or algorithms for identification, secrecy and authentication purposes. Nearly all such systems can be modeled as a capability-based access control system [3] in which each resource is assigned a secret key and a user granted with access right to the resource would be given its key. For example, in secure group communication [4] , each conference group is assigned a conference key which is given to all users belonging to the group so that secret communication and message authentication can be achieved within the group.
Ideally, the security requirement of a typical system is that all users not granted access to a resource should not be able to obtain or compute the key for it even in collusion. For instance, in secure group communication, it is necessary to ensure that all users outside a certain conference group (whose key is treated as a resource key) should not be able to derive the group key from their keys.
In most cases, the storage needed at each user could be too large to be practical. For example, in a typical access control system, if a user has a high level of privilege, his device may need to store a considerable number of keys. Since the cost of the tamper-resistant storage for the keys increases linearly with the size of the key storage, it is thus worthwhile to study techniques to generate all these keys from a smaller seed or compress the key materials. There is a similar problem facing emerging applications (which are sensitive to key storage cost) like sensor networks and RFID tags. Compressing key materials is essential to the scalability of such designs.
To ensure correctness of the operation of all cryptographic algorithms, key compression needs to be lossless. Besides, to protect a resource from unauthorized access by collusion of compromised users, a key compression scheme should not leak information that can ease unauthorized access to any resource key not given to the compromised users. This paper studies techniques to create dependency between resource keys (i.e. to derive one key from another) so as to reduce the storage requirement on each user device. In other words, we exploit the redundancy in privileged group memberships for key compression. The goal is to minimize the maximum of user key storage over all users. To link keys together, we need to consider the access memberships (i.e. the subset of legitimate users granted access right to a resource) of all the resources in the system to avoid compromising the security of some resources. We investigate the limit of this key derivation approach by giving a bound on maximum compression achievable without compromising the security of any resource key.
Existing work in the literature such as [8] , [7] only considers monotonic access structures. Whereas, this paper considers a much more general access structure without posing any restrictions on what properties it must have. The results of this paper are general enough to cover most application scenarios. Besides, the applicability of the model we use is not limited to symmetric or shared key systems. For asymmetric key systems, the model depicts the possession of private keys and the resources represent all algorithms requiring a private key input. The access control model considered here could cover a wide range of actual systems, including those not designed for access control purposes.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we derive the lower bound on key storage needed for a general access structure if key dependency is created between keys held by a user. This lower bound corresponds to the theoretical limit on maximum key compression achievable in an ideal access structure without key compromise. Second, we give a practical, provably secure key linking scheme (for a general access structure) based on pseudorandom functions (PRF). We have to emphasize that, unlike the existing schemes with key reuse such as [10] , [6] , the resulting key storage reduction does not come with a price of lowering the resilience or security against compromised nodes. The only trade-off is lowering the security guarantee from the information-theoretic sense to the computational-complexity-theoretic sense (due to the use of pseudorandom functions), which in essence makes no difference in practice.
In the next section, we present the definitions of access structures. In Sections III and IV, we present the key storage lower bound and the key linking construction based on pseudorandom functions respectively. Finally, we have some discussions in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
II. ACCESS STRUCTURE
We use an access control system to model a security system; a fairly wide range of applications can be covered by this model. The access structure of a typical system depicts the relations between users and keys/resources, as graphically shown in Figure 1 . Suppose U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n } is the set of users and R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } the set of resources in a system. Let 2 U be the set of all subsets of U and denote the set of all possible secret keys by K. Each resource r j ∈ R is associated with a key k j ∈ K and an ordered pair (P j , F j ) with P j ⊆ U and F j ⊂ 2 U ; P j is the subset of privileged users granted access to r j whereas each element in F j corresponds to a forbidden subset of users which should not be able to access r j even if all of them collude. Then the access structure of a system has the following definition. Definition 1. The access structure Γ of a security system (U, R, K) is the following set of 4-tuples: {(r j , k j , P j , F j ) :
In the above definition, a system is not required to guard against all illegitimate users outside the privileged group of a resource from accessing it. In practical scenarios, usually, only a bounded number of illegitimate users in collusion could be excluded; there is a tradeoff of security for storage. However, this paper considers an ideal access structure which is the most desired setting as raised by Naor et. al. [13] in the context of broadcast encryption. An access structure is ideal if all the illegitimate users to any resource in the system are excluded from accessing it.
Definition 2. An access structure
In a security system, the access structure is associated with a key assignment scheme. The set of keys held by a user may not be exactly the same as that of the resources he could access, but should allow him to compute all the resource keys he needs. An access structure graph, whose definition is given below, incorporates a key assignment to an access structure.
Definition 3.
Given a set of users U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n }, a set of resources R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } and a set of keys K, an access structure graph G for the system is a bipartite graph with vertex set V (G) = U ∪ R and edge set E(G) ⊆ U × R, and the following properties hold:
• (u i , r j ) ∈ E(G) if and only if u i can access r j .
• Each resource vertex r j is associated with a privileged user subset P j ⊆ U such that (u i , r j ) ∈ E(G) if and only if u i ∈ P j .
• Each resource vertex r j is associated with a key k j ∈ K. The associated key assignment of an access structure graph is said to be secure and sound if the following holds: a user u i can compute the key k j if and only if (u i , r j ) ∈ E(G) for all
III. A KEY STORAGE LOWER BOUND WITH KEY DEPENDENCY
This section uses the access structure graph defined in Section II to derive a lower bound on the key storage requirement if dependency is created between keys. In an access structure graph, the degree of each user vertex u i is the key storage requirement at u i assuming the users store the resource keys directly and each key has the same length, whereas, the degree of each resource vertex r j is the number of privileged users who can access it, which is the same as |P j |. Let the key storage at user u i be d i , the goal is to minimize max ui∈U {d i }.
Usually the resource keys should be picked independently at random to ensure security. However, for some users, storing multiple keys may be redundant. For instance, if a privileged group P 1 is the subset of another say P 2 , that is, P 1 ⊂ P 2 , then it is redundant for a user in P 1 to store k 2 (the key for P 2 ) in addition to k 1 (the key for P 1 ). If k 2 can be derived from k 1 , then the storage at each u i ∈ P 1 would be reduced by one key 1 , equivalent to removing the edge (u i , r 2 ) from G and adding a new edge between r 1 and r 2 (the key dependency). Note that the resulting graph is no longer bipartite.
Given two keys k j and k j for privileged subsets P j and P j , if k j is derived from k j , all users in P j would have access to k j . As a result, to ensure that the key linking does not compromise security, it is necessary to make sure that P j \P j = φ (the empty set). In other words, P j ⊂ P j if P j = P j . Otherwise, a user not in P j (but in P j ) would have access to k j . Subject to this constraint, the best achievable key storage reduction is given by the following theorem. Theorem 1: If dependency is created between keys while maintaining the ideal access structure and security of a system, depending on the access structure, the best achievable maximum storage at each user is at least m n where n is the total number of users and m is the total number of resources with distinct access membership. Proof. To maintain the security and access structure, a key k j can be derived from another key k j only if P j ⊂ P j and the users in P j \P j need to store k j while users in P j can generate k j from k j . If a key k j can be generated from k j , then |P j \P j | ≥ 1 since P j ⊂ P j (Note that the m resources have distinct access membership). That is, at least one user in P j needs to store k j . In other words, after key linking, each resource vertex in the access structure graph should have at least one edge coming from the set of user vertices. If we denote the number of edges coming from a user vertex to r j by y j ≥ 1 and the degree of a user u i by x i , then
In the best case, the degrees of any two users u i and u i should not differ by more than 1. Hence, the maximum user degree max ui∈U deg(u i ) ≥ m n . (A detailed proof is in [5] .) The result of Theorem 1 does not assume any concrete construction for creating the key dependency. It is rather general, discussing whether a particular key could be derived from another while maintaining security and what the best achievable key storage reduction is. In the best scenario, a 1 n reduction factor could be achieved by eliminating all redundancy in the privileged group memberships of a system. The lower bound in Theorem 1 is also tight as can be seen from the following example.
Shown in Figure 2 is an example for the complete secure group communication with 4 users. Originally, each user has to store 2 4−1 − 1 = 7 keys. Note that m = 11 and n = 4, and hence 11 4 = 3. After key linking 2 , the maximum number of keys of a user is 4 > 3.
Clearly, as long as there exist resource nodes (in the access structure graph) sharing a non-empty intersection between their access membership sets, key linking could always be possible between them, resulting in storage reduction at some users. However, it is not necessarily true that max ui∈U {d i }, the maximum of the key storage per user, can always be reduced. We may achieve storage reduction at all users but the one with maximum storage particularly when the access structure graph is very irregular. For instance, shown in Figure  3 is a case where key linking cannot lead to a reduction on the maximum of key storage per user (which is originally 3); no matter how key dependency is created, the maximum key storage per user is still 3 while the lower bound should be 5 8 = 1. Whether the lower bound (as stated in Theorem 1) can be achieved and whether key linking can reduce the maximum key storage per user depends on the access structure. Loosely speaking, if the access structure graph is dense, it is likely that a reduction on the maximum key storage per user can be achieved through key linking; if the degrees of user nodes are regular and the sequence of the degrees of the resource nodes (in ascending order) does not have a sharp difference between two consecutive elements, key linking is most effective with the resulting maximum key storage per user closest to the lower bound. A key linking algorithm with O(m 2 ) complexity (where m is the total number of resources) is given below to run experiments on different access structure graphs. The results agree with the above observations. A general algorithm to find an optimal key linking pattern.
Input: an access structure graph Output: an access structure graph with key linking 1) Sort the resource nodes according to the size of their privileged groups and assign an index (0,1,2, .....) to each node accordingly. 2) Pick the node with largest index to start with and set it as the current node. 3) From current node, pick a node with the next smaller index and set its index as the find-pointer. 4) Check if the node at find-pointer is a subset of the current node. a) If yes, mark all nodes which have the same privileged group size as the node at find-pointer and are also a subset of the current node. Find out the node among these marked nodes with minimum excluded user key storage and create a key link from this node to the current node. Go to step 5. b) If no, decrease the find-pointer by 1 and repeat step 4 if the find-pointer is non-negative, otherwise, go to step 5. 5) Decrease the current node index by 1. 6) Repeat steps 3-5 until the current node index is 0.
IV. A KEY DERIVATION SCHEME BASED ON PSEUDORANDOM FUNCTIONS
To design an optimal key linking scheme for a system, we can first use the algorithm in the last section to find an optimal key linking pattern and then construct a key derivation mechanism to implement the key links in the found pattern.
In order to generate or derive a key k from another key k, we could consider k as a seed to some pseudorandom generator g which outputs k . 3 The requirement of a suitable generator is that,without the knowledge of the seed k, to any computationally efficient algorithm (i.e. polynomial-time), the output of g is indistinguishable from any random number picked uniformly from the key space. This would ensure that the view to anyone (computationally bounded and without the knowledge of the seed) is almost identical to that without key linking, thus guaranteeing that nobody could learn any information about the seed key from the generated keys. This computational indistinguishability requirement is essential to ensuring the security of the whole system. The explanation is as follows: Note that the resulting keys from the generator is to be used as an input key to a certain cryptographic algorithm or protocol whose security guarantee is usually based on the assumption that the input key is uniformly picked from the key space. In fact, it can be shown that, if the distribution of the key generator output is computationally indistinguishable 4 from a uniform distribution over the key space, the security guarantee of cryptographic primitives like encryption and message authentication codes holds.
It should be noted that the direct application of a oneway function as the key generator is not sufficient to achieve the goal of key indistinguishability here (More details can Fig. 3 . An Example Access Structure Graph that Key Linking cannot lead to a Reduction on the Maximum Key Storage per User be found in [5] .). A more careful composition of one-way functions is needed for linking keys together, namely, a pseudorandom function (PRF) whose definition is as follows.
Definition 4.
Let H li→lo denote the set of all functions from
lo be a function which takes a seed key k ∈ {0, 1} l k and an input x ∈ {0, 1} li and outputs y ∈ {0, 1} lo (i.e. y = f k (x)). f is said to be a pseudorandom function if for all computationally efficient algorithms A the following is negligible in l k :
where A f k (·) and A f (·) denote that A is allowed oracle access to evaluate f k (·) and f (·) respectively at inputs of its choice.
This definition implies that if someone is allowed to evaluate a pseudorandom function f k (·) polynomially many times but has no knowledge of the key k being used, for a new input m, he is not able to tell apart the pseudorandom function output f k (m) and a random number picked from {0, 1}
lo . Suppose f is a PRF. To generate a key k for a resource (or privileged group) with label r from another key k for a resource with label r, we could consider the concatenation of the labels r||r as an input string to f and generate k as k = f k (r||r ). The property of f ensures that nobody (computationally bounded), without the knowledge of k, is able to distinguish k from a key directly picked from the key space with non-negligible advantage. This also guarantees that nobody could extract k from k . If there is a polynomial-time algorithm A which can extract k from k , then it could be used to tell whether a given k is generated form f or randomly picked as follows: run A on k to extract k and check if k ? = f k (r||r ); k is generated from f if and only if k = f k (r||r ); otherwise, flip a coin to make a random/wild guess. Hence, the key extraction problem is at least as difficult as solving the decisional problem non-negligibly better than a wild guess. The scheme is also resilient to user collusion. For colluded users in possession of both k and k , they only know that k is derived from k using a PRF but this information still cannot help to tell if k is derived from a PRF with some unknown key or is a truly random key. Conjectured pseudorandom functions which are efficient for the purpose here include AES-OMAC [11] and SHA-HMAC [2] . 5 It is natural to worry about whether such indistinguishability preserves if f is used to generate a series of keys, that is, whether k t is still computationally indistinguishable from a random key if it is generated from k in the following series: (r 1 ||r 2 ) ; . . .; k t = f kt−1 (r t−1 ||r t ). Nevertheless, the following theorem provides a guarantee.
is a PRF, k is uniformly picked from {0, 1} l k , and (r 1 ||r 2 ) ; . . .; k t = f kt−1 (r t−1 ||r t ). If t is polynomially many in l k , then {k t } ∼ = U l k (denoting the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable 6 ) where {k t } is the distribution of k t and U l k is the uniform distribution over {0, 1} l k .
Proof. Suppose we look at the generation of k i from k i−1 and assume that {k i−1 } ∼ = U l k with an indistinguishability coefficient i−1 (defined as the maximum indistinguishability advantage achievable by any poly-time algorithm); that is, i−1 is negligible. We know that k i = f ki−1 (r i−1 ||r i ) and wish to show that {k i } ∼ = U l k . We use the standard hybrid argument with the hybrid distribution
From the property of the PRF, K i ∼ = U l k with an indistinguishability coefficient f (negligible). We argue that K i ∼ = {k i } by contradiction. Suppose there is a PPT (probabilistic poly-time) algorithm A which can distinguish between K i and {k i } with a distinguishability advantage i , then it can be used to distinguish between {k i−1 } and U l k . The construction is as follows: for a given s ∈ {0, 1} l k , compute k = f s (r i−1 ||r i ) and run A on k. If s ∈ {k i−1 }, then k ∈ {k i }, whereas, if s ∈ U l k , then k ∈ K i . Thus this perfectly simulates the challenge of A in a real attack and could be used to distinguish between {k i−1 } and U l k (a contradiction to our assumption). Hence,
Summing over i, we have t ≤ t f . Since f is negligible in l k , if t is polynomially many, then t remains negligible in l k . This concludes the proof.
Since the security guarantee of a pseudorandom function is computationally complexity based, key linking based on a pseudorandom function is computationally secure.
V. DISCUSSIONS
While there is always reduction in the average storage whenever there is redundant membership, key linking may not lead to reduction on the maximum key storage per user in some access structures. Under the framework of constraints considered in this paper, it could be difficult to achieve reduction on the maximum storage in those cases. An analogy to this situation is Huffman encoding for the equiprobable case. This sets the limit of any scheme if trading off security is not considered. If further reduction on the maximum key storage is necessary, trading off the ideal access structure is one possible solution and combinatorial techniques could be applied as in [4] , [1] , [12] , [9] .
VI. CONCLUSION As applications involving low cost devices like sensor networks and RFID emerge, memory cost (for secure key storage) which is usually not a concern has become an essential constraint to designing security systems. To alleviate this, the required key storage could possibly be reduced by creating dependency among secret keys stored in a user device, that is, key linking. Key linking exploits redundancy in privileged group memberships for key compression. We derive an upper bound for maximum achievable key compression in a system with ideal, general access structure. This bound is tight and can somehow be treated as a negative result, which demonstrates that without trading off security, considerable key storage reduction may not be achievable. This provides ground for proposals [4] , [1] , [12] , [9] , [6] , [10] which trade off security for efficiency. We also show a provably secure instantiation of key linking using pseudorandom functions.
